dilluns, 23 de desembre del 2019

Regional policy paper: West Africa case

Regional policy paper: West Africa case

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this policy paper, an analysis of the security situation in West Africa will be found. In the
final part. recommendations bare in mind the intertwinement of different issues and their
regional, and therefore transnational nature of the threats. Direct violence is extreme in the
Sahel and the Lake Chad areas, therefore we assess actors to enhance joint military operations
along with foreign support, mainly in funding. This kind of violence lets free-passage to crime
networks to operate regarding sex trade and human and drug trafficking; to cope with this it is
proposed to combine educational and youth reforms together with economic development
promoted by the states and the regional organizations as the ECOWAS. Moreover, natural
threats are particularly severe in this African region, so this paper proposes to invest in
resilience technologies and methods concerning droughts and floods. All these threats
destabilize the region, leading to political volatility in local contexts; therefore, West African
states should reinforce public infrastructures and organization and reform its militaries in
order to confront insurgencies and its police corps to face other violent activities in an
effective way.

INTRODUCTION
West Africa region has been chosen to analyse because of its very diverse nature of security
risks. It is an area where we can find severe political, societal, natural and economical threats,
among others, and of which little attention is paid from the so-called West, excluding indeed
France, of course.
Despite the unequal footprint among the territories, terrorism has a major impact when
focusing on political threats due to its humanitarian consequences and its transformation, in
specific areas, into civil wars. West Africa is thought to be vulnerable to societal threats,
especially to organized crime due to its poverty, the weakness of governments and its
strategic location for trafficking routes (UNODC, 2009).
Natural catastrophes are linked to prolonged climate change consequences, rather than
punctual phenomenons, that have strong impacts on agriculture and thus in the economy and
the suppliance of basic needs; the lack of food and undernourishment have been for a long
time a major threat. In general terms, health has been always a relevant issue in the region’s
agenda: yellow fever and, later on, ebola, struck the area causing thousands of deaths.

A. Political security threats
Inter-state wars are unlikely to occur in West Africa, as there are many cooperation
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
African Union (AU). Also, it may be due to the fact that most of the states have many internal
conflicts or threats of different natures, as we are analysing in this paper; and then,
governments prefer to cooperate between them rather than engaging open armed
confrontation. For instance, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger created the G5
Sahel Joint Task Force to cooperate militarily and in police matters throughout the borders to
confront insurgency and transnational criminal activities with UN Security Council (UNSC)
and AU support (UN Security Council, 2017, S/RES/2359). In addition, as an example of
recent peaceful settlement of disputes, there is the mutually agreed ruling of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea between Ghana and Ivory Coast concerning deepwater oil and
gas in the ocean border (Farge & Kpodo, 2017). Despite all this, an interstate war would have
substantial consequences because it would weaken more governments letting a free-zone for
violent groups and destabilization.
Military coups d’état are of medium probability given the numerous historical record.
Between 1990 and 2010 there have been 37 coups in the region (Marc, Verjee & Mogaka,
2015, p.103), despite that, the amount has indeed declined, as a result of better-built democracies thanks to multi-level pressures. Nevertheless, militaries have still influence in the
states and officer corps are “strongly factionalized” ( Idem , 2015).
Terrorism is one of the most pressing issues. Concretely, terrorist actions count as much as
33.141 deaths in West Africa during 2002-2018; that means the 15’1% of the world and
almost three-quarters of Sub-Saharan Africa victims, being Nigeria the third most affected
country worldwide (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). Terrorism has serious
consequences in the security of both states and inhabitants, for instance, Boko Haram used the
abduction and enslavement of 276 schoolgirls in Nigeria in 2014 as a terror-spreading method
(International Crisis Group, 2019, p.7). However, thanks to the recent split of this group they
have lost power. Despite that, one of the surviving groups, the Islamic State of West Africa
Province (ISWAP), is growing in power and influence and it is creating a “largely symbiotic
relationship with the Lake Chad area’s inhabitants” (International Crisis Groups, 2019). This
issue serves us to determine the next matter: state failure. In the aforementioned zone, jihadist
groups are replacing state’s governance and public services, a factor the empowers them and
shrinks state’s popular legitimacy. State failure is likely to happen if the direction of events
does not change, and that can lead to the creation of Islamist proto-states just as ISIL did in
the Middle East with catastrophic consequences regarding human rights, economy, stability
and such.
All of this should be linked too to existing civil wars and insurgency. The main civil war is in
Mali, where the Northern part of the country is not ruled by the official government but by
several actors as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), who are Tuareg separatists, and other jihadist militias
(Dukulé, 2019). To counter this issue, the Malian army is assisted by 10,000 soldiers of the
UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, 5,000 of the Sahel G5 and 4.000 of the French
Barkhane Operation, plus the bilateral aid agreements between G5 members and the EU and
the US (Cooke, 2017).
To conclude political threats, it is necessary to mention that many terrorist conflicts,
concretely in Nigeria, become insurgency threats, as groups become militias with
military-kind organizations and they control vast areas of the country (Mahmood & Christian,
2018, p.7). Therefore, while analysing it may be difficult to differentiate well terrorism, civil wars and insurgency, as the degree of violent power and nature of these groups blurs frontiers
between these threats.

B. Societal threats
In a short period of time, West Africa has become a relevant scenario in drug trafficking, it is
the route for Latin America-and-Asia-originated cocaine and heroin heading Europe. E. g., the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime has expressed its concern and has highlighted the issue with
the following data: up to 30 tons of cocaine and almost half a tone of heroin travelled through
the area only in 2011 (Aning & Pokoo, 2013).
Drug-dealing networks have a growing undeniable link to the public institutions, their weak
governance and corruption has a direct repercussion on the state’s capabiliby to provide peace
and security, as it is an obstacle to proper development and ability to confront threats.
(Security Council, 2011).
Human trafficking is another relevant threat to be analyzed due to the existence of
transnational criminal networks operating with migrants heading Europe: since 2014 over
600.000 persons arrived in Italy through the Central Mediterranean route. (Kirwin &
Anderson, 2018 ). The net migration number for 2020 in the region is predicted to be minus
885,000, so there is an obvious pulse to leave the region, many of whom emigrate due to
labour reasons (International Organization for Migration, n.d.) or they are forced to do so:
only in 2018 over 620,000 West African refugees were registered. (Migration data portal,
n.d.)
In addition, child traffic for labour and sexual exploitation is remarkable, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) sets to almost 300,000 the number of children having been
trafficked in West and Central Africa for these purposes. (Sawadogo, 2012)
Concerning gender-related violence, sex trade and sexual exploitation are relevant. Statistics
show African women are 10% of the Western European sex labour market. In absolute terms,
- and taking into account that the victim detection rate is one to thirty - the number of
exploited women is estimated to be 17.000; in monetary terms, the market is worth around
USD 850 million (UNODC, 2009).
On the other side, it is stated that “domestic violence is one of the biggest threats to women’s
health and well-being (...) -especially those recovering from conflict-” (International Rescue
Committee, 2012). The same report seeks to get domestic violence treated as a humanitarian
issue; women’s oppression and gender discrimination are a structural problem rather than just
a “private matter”.
For these reasons, even if its relative impact is medium, there is a very high probability of this
particular risk to threaten the region, especially due to their structural causes: severe
inequality, economic limitations, the feminization of poverty and inherent corruption, among
many others (Sawadogo, 2012).

C. Natural catastrophes threats
In a context of worldwide insecurity regarding climate change, we could locate West Africa
as one of the most affected regions of the world, a hotspot. The hot days are expected to
increase and the temperatures will rise faster than in other regions of the world (Shepard,
2018). This will cause strong droughts, and it will be harder to cultivate having less
technological development in the agricultural field. The length of the dry spells will be longer,
making the plantation process almost impossible (Diedhiou, Bichet, Wartenburger,
Seneviratne, Rowell, Sylla, et al. & Affholder, 2018), added to the fact that economic and
institutional capacity to confront climate variability is very weak (Sultan & Gaetani 2016).
In addition, tropical climate affecting the South is accompanied by extreme rainfalls with
subsequent important floods that cannot be handled by the agricultors. These are getting more
severe as there is a deforestation process, where most of the water is kept (Fiorillo, Crisci,
Issa, Maracchi, Morabito & Tarchiani, 2018).
We locate both droughts and floods on “very high impact” on the risk matrix, as their
consequences are and will be catastrophic for the entire population. Moreover, they also
create food insecurity, agricultural economy effects, and health issues, as people lose access
to food and hunger could make people lose their integrity.
However, there is a difference: while droughts last longer and they are getting more frequent,
floods happen in precise periods and could be diminished by reforestation policies and others.

D. Economic/financial threats
On average the regional GDP has grown during the last years, arriving at 3.9% in 2019.
Despite this positive increment, underdevelopment and inequality are still major threats, as
43% of the population is below the 1.90 USD (PPP) per day, internationally settled as the line
for extreme poverty (African Development Bank, 2019).
In spite of the already mentioned economical rise, only about a third of the Ivory Coast,
Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria’s population between 15 and 24 years old participates in the formal
labour force ( Verjee & Mogaka, 2015). Youth unemployment is probable in the future and has
limited consequences. This kind of unemployment not only foment violence, discontent and a
frustration feeling but also encourages them to participate in drug-trafficking activities, which
enables to achieve wealth and social status (Alexandre, Verjee & Mogaka, 2015). Also,
informal economy employs up to 50-80% in some West African countries (Jütting & De
Laiglesia, 2009).
The fiscal situation is unstable too, for instance, debt interests absorbed about 70% of
revenues in Nigeria (COFACE, 2019), and other countries are affected in the framework of
the historical debt crisis in Africa that drag countries into budget deficits nowadays. However,
it is slightly declining, because of an expenditure reduction. Thus, the fiscal situation is
situated in the green boxes of the matrix, as long as the area does not suffer from any sudden
shocks (such as falling oil prices, natural catastrophes, political crisis, etc.), budget deficit or
currency devaluation, should remain under the control of the central bank and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

E. Technological threats
As this region is not especially developed regarding technology in communications, structures
and services there are no particular risks to mention in this matter beyond the everyday
difficulties population have to deal with, which, nowadays, are not significative enough to
pose a threat to security.

F. Health threats
West Africa has gone through rough periods because of pandemics. The Yellow Fever and
Ebola have hit the region heavily. But there is an issue that involves the whole region and has
a direct impact on the health of their population: hunger. There are different reasons for it, but
“broad issues of poverty, natural resource disparities, unequal global trading arrangements,
and poor or corrupt government(s), among others” are the main reasons of it (Brown,
Hintermann & Higgins, 2009, p.8,016).
Having Sierra Leone the highest score (30.4) (Global Hunger Index, 2019b), the western
region is on a serious moment with the food issue according to the Global Hunger Index’
data. Niger, for example, ranks the 101st position out of 117 countries, but their situation has
been improving since 2000, where its score was 52.1, extremely alarming.
Despite the improvement of the situation according to the rank, malnutrition and its rise are
still an issue that worries the international community. In Niger, a low agricultural
production, conflict, population displacement, and increased cereal prices have driven the
country to a worsened situation on food insecurity (Global Hunger Index, 2019a).
Anyway, food insecurity is obviously not the only health threat. Attention must be paid to the
pandemics mentioned before: Yellow Fever and Ebola. The Ebola outbreak was one of the
most brutal pandemics of all-time, and its focus was in West Africa. Between 2014 and 2016
this illness killed more people (more than 11,000) in the region than it had done since the
virus was first discovered in 1976 (World Health Organization, n.d).
The Yellow Fever has been in West Africa since before the 1950s. The worst outbreak of it
was on the 1985-1989 period, in which 12.681 cases were reported (World Health
Organization, 2005). Even though it looked like it was under control after 1994, the disease
reappeared strongly in the 2000s. Since then, an effort has been made to stop the expansion of
the virus with vaccination policies and other measures that each country decided, but there are
still some small outbreaks that create an insecure environment.
On the risk matrix, both the food insecurity and the pandemics risk are located on the medium
impact, as they do not involve the whole society but are mortal for the ones who suffer it.
Furthermore, both pandemics and the food issue are risks that grow exponentially. Even though, they do not share the likelihood grade. While the food insecurity ranks the top
probability because it is not only likely to happen, but it is happening right now; the
pandemics are something that is not a real danger now. Anyway, historically, pandemics that
hit the region expand rapidly and there are few resources to cope with them, so any illness
that appears or re-appears could end up being unstoppable.

SWOT ANALYSIS
In this section, the attention has been focused on terrorism-insurgency as it is a threat with
very high probabilities to impact - it already exists - and strong consequences, that at the same
time are linked to many of the other analyzed risks: such as crime, economic, natural and
societal instabilities and risks. Terrorism and insurgency are analysed together because in the
region terrorist organizations act also as insurgencies the way militias do in same or different
areas.

SWOT Assessment of West Africa’s capabilities to confront terrorism-insurgency.
Key Strengths
- French military involvement (particularly in Mali)
- Foreign funding of security programs (EU + US + France)
- International involvement (UN: MINUSMA + AU)
- Regional cooperation (ECOWAS + G5 Sahel)
Key Weaknesses
- Extreme poverty (43% under the daily 1.90USD (PPP))
- Spread corruption
- Vulnerable geographic situation: exposed to significant
climate change consequences.
- Weak economy and high unemployment rates
- Lack of human rights implementation
9
Key Opportunities
- Possible NATO involvement (led by France)
- Further peace and security cooperation within the AU and
UNSC involvement
- Improvement on education to stop child recruitment
- Seize the terrorist-insurgent organizations
Key Threats
- Recovery of Boko Haram’s successors
- Strong climate change effects in the future (destabilization)
- Violent organized crime
- Lack of material well-being that leads to discontent

Conclusion and recommendations
As a summary, it can be said that political threats leave free passage to societal risks,
deepening inequality, extreme poverty and institutional weakness and instability; then
transnational organized crime takes advantage of that, all in a context of natural and health
threats.
Due to the aforementioned threats and risks of the Western Africa region, the following are
policy recommendations for states and regional and international organizations.
1. Enhancing a comprehensive military policy in the region, deepening and broadening
the G5 Sahel spirit.
2. Encompassing transfrontier integration to confront illegal crime and terrorism
through the ECOWAS.
3. Fighting corruption and watching for transparent management and control of the
institutions.
4. Cooperating with the EU, the AU and others in technological and funding matters
concerning natural resilience.
5. Improving t he s tate’s educational and youth systems to assure future perspectives to
new generations to prevent youngsters from being attracted by irregular activities.
6. Promoting e conomic development through the regional domestic market and sensible
and well-balanced public budgets.
7. Investing in technological methods to increase natural risk resilience.
8. Working o n common reform protocols and frameworks concerning the military and
police structures aiming territorial effectiveness.
As we have seen throughout the policy paper, all the threats analysed are interlinked and
increase each other’s likeliness and impact. In conclusion, for broadly-ranged and
transnationally distributed risks West Africa needs a comprehensive and regional approach to
its security.

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Autonomous Weapons in Security, should they be banned?


3rd December 2019
What uses of artificial intelligence in today’s and tomorrow’s war should be allowed, restricted and completely excluded?
Artificial Intelligence (AI) may be seen as a science fiction and technology-only matter, however, it poses major questions about society, politics and security, just as other major technological leaps did.
Being aware of the per se bias of social sciences, I acknowledge my point of departure: war is immoral, and it should be eradicated. Despite that, this utopia should not obstacle theorizing about the meanwhile, with the aim of diminishing human suffering in the wars to come.
First of all, we need a definition of AI: a system that autonomously and algorithmically decides actions given determined circumstances. In the security and war field, AI is applied to Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS), which can self-select targets with the process above mentioned.

AWS issue serious legal, practical and moral problems that eventually conduct to the belief that their use ought to be extremely restricted, if not banned. To begin with, International Humanitarian Law has two important principles: distinction and proportionality. The former, is the military-civil differentiation[1], and AI may not really recognize well a civilian, a surrendering soldier or a prisoner of war. The latter prohibits actions that may cause more damage than the actual military advantage[2], but AWS will not have the contextual understanding to balance this, algorithms have aims and means, material and mainly human destruction is not quantitatively measurable by machines, as “only humans can make context-specific judgements” [3].
Moreover, the Martens Clause introduced by the Hague II Convention of 1899 stated that matters not included in the regulations should be guided by the “laws of humanity and (…) public conscience” [4], even if the definition of those terms is arguable, for me and many citizens the aim of those are to reduce suffering and to humanely conduct wars, which cannot be achieved through the development of the so-called “Killer Robots”.

Secondly, regarding the practical issues we will dig into the quantitative concerns of wars. Even if there is no agreement within experts on whether AWS would be advantageous to the attacker or the defender, to know if they would incentivize or deter armed conflict, we can determine that as wars would become more abstract for the public they would become more likely[5], added to the fact that fewer human deaths – of the offensive faction – would carry less political consequences of war, i. e. no more Vietnams; nevertheless, technological gaps would become disruptive with terrible lethal consequences for the human-based armies of less developed states or private factions.
Besides, we should bear in mind the lobbying of the new military-industrial-technological complex to governments to go towards fully autonomous militaries, adding the absence of “costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials” of AWS that would make them ubiquitous in military powers[6], an issue that would lead to a dangerous already-lived arms race. Plus, non-state actors would have far more capacities to increase state and personal security in destabilization with the hybrid capabilities that AI will enhance.

Another argument is that of the responsibility. As the advocates of AWS’ prohibition state, “humans may fade out of the decision-making loop” [7], then, the inevitable question arises: who will be responsible for AWS’ misbehaving? The designers and programmers? The commander that gave the broad order? The governmental owners of these machines? No one could be held responsible before a national or an international court, because the mere characteristic of autonomy exempts responsibility further that the machine itself, which cannot be held accountable to human justice for evident reasons. Therefore, “a war cannot be waged justly if no-one could be morally and legally held accountable for such serious wrongings” [8], because justice may be applied when the criminal can recognize beforehand the wrongdoing of his/her conduct.

Thirdly and finally, we should look at the moral matters. When talking about this, we tend to believe that robots or AWS will not have moral constraints, as soldiers do have “humane treatment, compassion and empathy for their fellow humans” [9]. That is partially true, but in warfare soldiers usually have “fear, hatred and cruelty”, AWS will not have emotions, neither the good nor the bad ones; therefore, it can be argued that robots will follow more strictly the rules of humanitarian law and the military code[10] [11]. However, as many power organizations – being public or non-state actors – tend to be “ethically corrupt or even evil”, the programming and the orders AWS follow will be the key issue, because autonomous robots will have immense capabilities complying military objectives, an those can be humanely immoral[12].
Nowadays there are many discussions over the morality of the issue. Is it ethical to deliver the decision over life and death to autonomous machines[13]? Also, it can be strongly questioned the fact that probabilities, upon which algorithms, AWS, are based, determine life, or rather, the termination of it.
To end this part, a last point has not been very proposed by experts. From a human security perspective, AWS would be a source of insecurity taking in mind the freedom from fear concept. The argument would be that regarding the widely spread and current sensations of the population in respect to killer robots, people, societies could see Autonomous Weapons as dangerous, incomprehensible and uncontrolled machines, as weapons systems with no emotions nor feelings. Those issues would most probably lead to a generalized sense of distrust, instability and eventually insecurity within communities.

As a conclusion, the international community should enforce control over AI warfare applications in accordance with the following prescriptions: (a) ban of fully autonomous weapons, (b) regulation to have meaningful human control on specific attacks to semi-autonomous weapons, supervised autonomous weapons, and to autonomous weapons if no possibility of the aforementioned ban is practically applicable, (c) human capacity to suspend / abort attacks prior to impact, and (d) regulation to allow non-lethal AI warfare applications as transportation, reconnaissance and such. International regulation is a must if we want to avoid uncontrolled development of weapons which have many questionable points as we have seen.

Total number of words: 998
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-          Müller V. & Simpson T. (2014). Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good NewsSociable Robots and the Future of Social Relations - Proceedings of Robo-Philosophy 2014 (pp. 297-305). (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications; Vol. 273). IOS Press. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-480-0-297
-          Noah Harari, Y. (2018). 21 lliçons per al segle XXI. Barcelona: Edicions 62
-          Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). CCW/CONF.V/2 (2016) - Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.


[1] Casanovas & Rodrigo, 2012, p. 502
[2] Idem, 2012, p.502
[3] International Committee of the Red Cross, 2018
[4] Convention with respect to the laws of war on land (Hague II), 29 July 1899
[5] Kaspersen & Barth, 2016
[6] Future of Life Institute, 2015
[7] Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2018
[8] Müller & Simpson, 2014, p. 7
[9] Human Rights Watch & International Human Rights Clinic, 2018, p. 2
[10] Noah Harari, 2018, p. 105-107
[11] Brookings Institution, 2018, min. 21:49-22:45
[12] Noah Harari, op. cit.
[13] Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Expert son Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems – CCW/CONF.V/2, p. 10

Humanitarian intervention


Humanitarian intervention(s)
The notion of humanitarian intervention has deeply changed over time. Both for the general public and policy-makers, and for the scholars. The following is an analysis of three papers written by M. Finnemore, M. Mandelbaum and S. Hoffmann respectively on this concept, each one with a specific vision of the concerning issue.
Fundamentally, for Martha Finnemore on Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, this concept is a practical consequence of the dynamic evolution of norms concerning international military interferences.
The author believes that since realist and liberal approaches to the international system understand that states are bound to its economic and/or geostrategic interests, humanitarian intervention does not fit very well in these two theories. Therefore, as in many historical occasions no obvious national interest was found in the justification of third state interventions (such as it happened in 1989, Somalia, by the United States), Finnemore argues that those acts were due to a change in “normative standards (…) concerning appropriate ends and means of military intervention” (Columbia U.P., 1996, p.155).
In this document it is conceived that norms shape interests and then interests shape action. Justifications of the interventions clearly reflect the normative context, that is, shared values and expectations.
From a historical point of view, in the XIX century and in the first ¾ of the XX, the interventions with some humanitarian justifications were merely unilateral. If in a case the interventions were multilateral was because of an evident strategic interest of the groups of states.
Afterwards, the change into multilateral humanitarian interventions was partly due to the decolonization process that provided the self-determination right together with the sovereign statehood to ex-colonized peoples; that meant that unilateral interventions would be extremely difficult to justify in front of a different normative context (the UN Charter for instance) in respect to these new nations. Therefore, after 1945, the practical translation of Responsibility to Protect, humanitarian intervention, became multilateral in order to legitimize itself. And the United Nations was the best umbrella under which R2P should be carried out, following Finnemore’s thought.
We can see the evolution towards the contemporary concept of humanitarian intervention in the historical examples. First, mainly in the 19th century, interventions were narrowed into the national interest of the European states that coincided with the normative context of the religious and/or ethnic ties between Western societies and the victims of which states were supposedly responsible: in practice, Christians and populations in the East linked to European peoples. Nevertheless, norms did in a certain way shape the strategic interests of states. Then, the concept of those deserving intervention broadened as the Western conception of humanity universalized including non-Christians and non-Europeans.
In the paper, Finnemore emphasizes that the scholar world should clarify better the sources of change in the normative arena by studying concrete cases. Furthermore, the writer states that the relation between power and norms “may not be so simple” (Ibid., p.185) referring to the Gramscian conception that normative structures are framed by and for the most powerful. She argues that the dynamic origins of norms are for instance public opinion, the media, and international institutions.
In the paper written by Mandelbaum, as stated in its title “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, he understands humanitarian intervention as a prolongation of the policies of the national governments of states. In the case given, the author centers in analyzing US interventions during the Clinton Administrations (Foreign Affairs, January-February 1996, p.16-32).
The initial proposals of President Clinton were playing the role of social work power in the international arena. However, Clinton jeopardized this path of focusing on the humanitarian needs of the periphery by not paying attention to the domestic public support. This is because, as said in the article, Americans tend more to back humanitarian initiatives when they come along with US national interests, such as it happened in the Cold War. Then, when Clinton tried to present his humanitarian interventions to the domestic public, he and his Administrations could not justify in any case the appeal to national interest. Mendelbaum shows this illustrating the issues of Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia: the former two have no strategic interest for the US and even less in the post-Cold War era, and Clinton abandoned his bellicose discourse with Serbia following the Dayton Accords.
To summarize, Mandelbaum’s work conceives humanitarian intervention another branch of domestic politics.
On his behalf, Hoffmann articulates humanitarian intervention as a result of socially constructed norms of what is acceptable or not in the world order (Foreign Affairs, March-April 1996, p.172-175). Also, he does not separate interests and values; criticizing Mendelbaum on his deterministic conception of what is the national security concept, and states that this one is shaped by policymakers.
Moreover, as said, Hoffmann’s conception of humanitarian intervention is rooted in the vast interconnection and interdependence of the new global society. Therefore, he proposes two key causes for humanitarian intervention: (a) important threat for peace and security in the region or the world and/or (b) a massive violation of human rights. Obviously, as constructs, as not self-evident, they are susceptible to change, despite this dynamic factor, the author believes that these two elements are not acceptable according to his values and probably to the ones of many people too. In addition, this clear idea of intervention was not exposed well to the public by President Clinton, and that was a main issue that lead to his foreign policy failure.
In conclusion, we see humanitarian intervention as a practical consequence of the evolution of a norm by Finnemore, as a branch of domestic politics by Mendelbaum, and as a result of socially and globally constructed norms by Hoffmann.

References
1. Mandelbaum, Michael, “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 1996.
2.Hoffmann, Stanley, “In Defence of Mother Teresa”, Foreign Affairs, March-April 1996.
3.Finnemore, Martha, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in Katzenstein, Peter, The Culture of National Security, New York, Columbia U.P., 1996.

La Desnuclearització d’Ucraïna dins l’Espai ex-Soviètic


La Desnuclearització d’Ucraïna dins l’Espai ex-Soviètic
Ucraïna posseeix tecnologia nuclear per fins no militars, de fet, basa la majoria de la seva producció d’electricitat en les centrals nuclears, uns 15 reactors generen gairebé la meitat de l’electricitat produïda pel país (World Nuclear Association, 2019). Aquesta tendència sembla no voler invertir-se i fins i tot s’exporta bastanta energia nuclear a Europa occidental amb gran part de recursos naturals de Rússia. Tot i això, últimament Ucraïna busca més autonomia respecte Rússia enfortint l’energia nuclear -per no dependre d’importacions russes com el carbó o el gas- i amb acords energètics amb la UE.
A dia d’avui l’Estat no posseeix armes nuclears de cap tipus. Durant l’època de la República Socialista Soviètica d’Ucraïna sí que hi havia armes nuclears diverses propietat de la Unió Soviètica, però es va desmantellar l’arsenal nuclear el 1996 com a resultat de l’anomenat Memoràndum de Budapest (Budjeryn, 2018a), del qual se’n parlarà amb més profunditat més endavant.
El 16 de novembre de 1994 el parlament ucraïnès va ratificar el Tractat de No Proliferació d’Armes Nuclears (NPT) amb estatus d’estat no nuclear, que a la pràctica va implicar el desmantellament de tot l’arsenal nuclear soviètic del país, que era a l’època el tercer amb més caps nuclears del món (Fernández, 1994). En canvi, Ucraïna no ha signat ni ratificat el Tractat sobre la Prohibició de les Armes Nuclears (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019).
Aquí s’intentarà explicar les raons que van portar a desmantellar l’arsenal nuclear ucraïnès segons els tres models de Scott D. Sagan. En primer lloc, per entendre les raons del model de seguretat sobre la decisió de desmantellar el gran arsenal nuclear del que disposava el país eslau cal anar al citat Memoràndum de Budapest en el marc de la CSCE el 1994. Aquest era un tractat internacional acordat per Rússia, Regne Unit, Estats Units i Ucraïna en el que a canvi de l’accés d’aquest últim al Tractat de No Proliferació les altres parts -potències nuclears-, es comprometien a respondre a qualsevol atac nuclear i a respectar la sobirania i integritat territorial d’Ucraïna (United Nations Treaty Collection, 1994, 3-5). Si apliquem la teoria dels models de Sagan, concretament el model de seguretat, la raó principal pel desmantellament seria aquest Memoràndum, que va assegurar als dirigents ucraïnesos de l’època la garantia de les grans potències nuclears mundials.
Tot i això, és notori que aquesta garantia no va ser complerta per Rússia, que el 2014 va ocupar i annexionar-se la península de Crimea i ha intervingut al conflicte de l’Est d’Ucraïna a les regions de Donetsk i Lugansk sense respectar evidentment el dret internacional i explícitament el Memoràndum de Budapest, al no respectar les fronteres existents. És a dir, l’acord expressat al Memoràndum no va ser creïble en termes dissuasius entre les grans potències, ja que Rússia va intervenir directament a l’ex-república soviètica sense cap represàlia substancial de les altres parts, Estats Units i Regne Unit. Mentre que la potència russa va qüestionar i ha qüestionat internament la credibilitat en l’acord de 1994, els dirigents ucraïnesos, segons el mateix Sagan, degut als antics lligams estrets amb Moscou (...) no percebien a Rússia com a una amenaça important a la seva seguretat i sobirania (Sagan, 1996, 61), malgrat que amb una òptica històrica, Rússia tingui una cultura estratègica expansionista que tendeix a tenir grans zones d’influència més enllà de les seves fronteres com a “estats coixí”, però els estadistes ucraïnesos no van tenir aquesta mentalitat - o no va pesar tant - i per això no van mantenir les armes nuclears com a element dissuasiu respecte el país veí.
D’altra banda, també és cert que després de la independència d’Ucraïna, l’Estat no tenia prou recursos ni tecnologia militar suficient com per mantenir i tenir preparades les armes nuclears, cosa que operativament feia difícil conservar-les i de cara a la dissuasió, que és el principal poder de l’armament nuclear, aquesta infectivitat faria difícilment creïble la capacitat de represàlies de l’ex-república soviètica envers les altres potències regionals (Fernández, 1994).
En segon lloc, des d’una perspectiva del model de Sagan de política interior, una altra causa que podria haver col·laborat a prendre la decisió del desmantellament és l’accident nuclear de Txernòbil (Budjeryn, 2018b), que hauria aportat un ambient de desconfiança de la societat ucraïnesa envers aquest tipus d’armament – tot i seguir produint energia nuclear. Aquesta intenció la veiem plasmada ja en la Declaració de Sobirania d’Ucraïna de 1990, on el país s’adhereix a tres principis no-nuclears: no acceptar, produir, o comprar armes nuclears (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1990); així mateix la Rada -el parlament- ho confirma específicament a la Declaració sobre l’Estatus No-Nuclear d’Ucraïna assegurant la futura incorporació al NPT i afirmant la temporalitat de la presència de les armes nuclears a territori de l’estat independitzat (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1991, Art. 1 i 7).
Tot i aquestes declaracions dels legisladors, al Govern hi havia també partidaris de seguir amb la nuclearització, sobretot dins l’establishment de defensa, com un antic home fort de l’Exèrcit i diputat a la data, que advocava per mantenir els Míssils Balístics Intercontinentals (ICBMs) i desmantellar altres tipus d’armes nuclears, per mantenir la seguretat nacional en cooperació amb Rússia (Budjeryn, 2018b). Però aquesta visió era més aviat minoritària entre els estadistes del moment, com seria el Ministre d’Afers Exteriors, que creia que l’establiment d’infraestructures militars nuclears seria un llast considerable per la deplorable economia ucraïnesa (Budjeryn, 2018b); i també el mateix primer president d’Ucraïna era bastant pro-occidental (Kimmage, 2017) i per guanyar-se  les simpaties i el reconeixement de la comunitat internacional pro-democràtica -a un país corromput dirigit per antigues elits comunistes i nous oligarques- hauria calgut mostrar una imatge neutral internacionalment desnuclearitzant-se.
En tercer lloc, adoptant el model normatiu de S. Sagan, hi ha varis elements d’escala internacional que haurien portat a la decisió de la desnuclearització -d’armament exclusivament- de la Ucraïna recentment escindida, o al menys haurien portat a un ambient procliu a prendre aquesta decisió. Per començar, ens hem de situar en un context internacional on el NPT estava molt estès i les altres dues repúbliques ex-soviètiques nuclearitzades – Bielorússia i Kazakhstan – havien accedit al Tractat; a més, amb la caiguda del bloc soviètic hi havia un cert consens per mantenir l’estabilitat a la regió. D’altra banda, el Ministre d’Exteriors mencionat anteriorment va assegurar a un informe que no signar el Tractat de No Proliferació podria portar una reacció internacional no favorable a la recent nascuda nació independent (Budjeryn, 2018b). Després de la dissolució de la Unió Soviètica, tant Ucraïna com Kazakhstan i Bielorússia, que tenien armament nuclear, es dirimien entre declarar-se hereus nuclears de la Unió Soviètica de l’armament en el seu territori o desmantellar-lo. Ucraïna finalment va optar per entregar-lo gradualment a Rússia, perquè no era possible ser posseïdor d’armes nuclears amb ser un membre “no-nuclear” del NPT, i si l’Estat ucraïnès hagués decidit prendre control d’aquest armament i vetar a Rússia el seu transport, hagués hagut de marxar del NPT, amb les conseqüències diplomàtiques que podria haver comportat. Davant d’això, podríem concloure que els governants continuaren amb la desnuclearització per donar una imatge a la societat internacional de no-bel·ligerància d’Ucraïna, una república nascuda amb quasi 2.000 caps nuclears (Luer, 2017). Així mateix, els Estats Units veien Ucraïna com un possible futur aliat o almenys no aliat amb Rússia, i els governs dels països occidentals ponderaven la possibilitat d’una hipotètica incorporació a l’OTAN i/o a la UE, o simplement una aproximació  a Occident en el marc de l’històric balanceig del país entre l’Est i l’Oest (Kimmage, 2017); això segurament va fer una pressió al conjunt de nuclis de poder d’Ucraïna per inclinar-se cap a la desnuclearització i així guanyar-se el favor de les potències econòmiques occidentals.
En definitiva, seguint només un sol model no es pot determinar la causa absoluta del desmantellament nuclear, però principalment es pot encaixar millor en el model normatiu, on els parlamentaris, la societat internacional i les potències mundials i regionals volien estabilitat i una zona menys amenaçada per la guerra nuclear, enmig de la pressió del NPT i dels antecedents dels països ex-soviètics a la regió; fets tots que van portar a Ucraïna a desmantellar el tercer arsenal nuclear més gran del món.


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